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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The 2007-2009 recession was long and deep, and according to several indicators was the most 
severe economic contraction since the 1930s (but still much less severe than the Great Depression). The 
slowdown of economic activity was moderate through the first half of 2008, but at that point the 
weakening economy was overtaken by a major financial crisis that would exacerbate the economic 
weakness and accelerate the decline. 
Economic recovery began in mid-2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) has been on a positive track 
since then, although the pace has been uneven and slowed significantly in 2011. The stock market has 
recovered from its lows, and employment has increased moderately. On the other hand, significant 
economic weakness remains evident, particularly in the balance sheet of households, the labor market, 
and the housing sector. 
Congress was an active participant in the policy responses to this crisis and has an ongoing interest in 
macroeconomic conditions. Current macroeconomic concerns include whether the economy is in a 
sustained recovery, rapidly reducing unemployment, speeding a return to normal output and employment 
growth, and addressing government’s long-term debt problem. 
In the typical post-war business cycle, lower than normal growth during the recession is quickly followed 
by a recovery period with above normal growth. This above normal growth serves to speed up the reentry 
of the unemployed to the workforce. Once the economy reaches potential output (and full employment), 
growth returns to its normal growth path, where the pace of aggregate spending advances in step with the 
pace of aggregate supply. There is concern that this time the U.S. economy will either not return to its pre-
recession growth path but perhaps remain permanently below it, or return to the pre-crisis path but at a 
slower than normal pace. Problems on the supply side and the demand side of the economy have so far 
led to a weaker than normal recovery. 
If the pace of private spending proves insufficient to assure a sustained recovery, would further stimulus 
by monetary and fiscal policy be warranted? One lesson from the Great Depression is to guard against a 
too hasty withdrawal of fiscal and monetary stimulus in an economy recovering from a deep decline. The 
removal of fiscal and monetary stimulus in 1937 is thought to have stopped a recovery and caused a 
slump that did not end until WWII. Opponents of further stimulus maintain that the accumulation of 
additional government debt would lower future economic growth, but supporters argue that additional 
stimulus is the appropriate near-term policy. Moreover, in 2011-2012, the sharply fading effects of fiscal 
stimulus and weaker growth in Europe have likely dampened economic growth. 
In regard to the long-term debt problem, in an economy operating close to potential output, government 
borrowing to finance budget deficits will in theory draw down the pool of national saving, crowding out 
private capital investment and slowing long-term growth. However, the U.S. economy is currently 
operating well short of capacity and the risk of such crowding out occurring is therefore low in the near 
term. Once the cyclical problem of weak demand is resolved and the economy has returned to a normal 
growth path, mainstream economists’ consensus policy response for an economy with a looming debt 
crisis is fiscal consolidation—cutting deficits. Such a policy would have the benefits of low and stable 
interest rates, a less fragile financial system, improved investment prospects, and possibly faster long-
term growth. 
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Summary 
The 2007-2009 recession was long and deep, and according to several indicators was the most 
severe economic contraction since the 1930s (but still much less severe than the Great 
Depression). The slowdown of economic activity was moderate through the first half of 2008, but 
at that point the weakening economy was overtaken by a major financial crisis that would 
exacerbate the economic weakness and accelerate the decline. 
Economic recovery began in mid-2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) has been on a 
positive track since then, although the pace has been uneven and slowed significantly in 2011. 
The stock market has recovered from its lows, and employment has increased moderately. On the 
other hand, significant economic weakness remains evident, particularly in the balance sheet of 
households, the labor market, and the housing sector. 
Congress was an active participant in the policy responses to this crisis and has an ongoing 
interest in macroeconomic conditions. Current macroeconomic concerns include whether the 
economy is in a sustained recovery, rapidly reducing unemployment, speeding a return to normal 
output and employment growth, and addressing government’s long-term debt problem. 
In the typical post-war business cycle, lower than normal growth during the recession is quickly 
followed by a recovery period with above normal growth. This above normal growth serves to 
speed up the reentry of the unemployed to the workforce. Once the economy reaches potential 
output (and full employment), growth returns to its normal growth path, where the pace of 
aggregate spending advances in step with the pace of aggregate supply. There is concern that this 
time the U.S. economy will either not return to its pre-recession growth path but perhaps remain 
permanently below it, or return to the pre-crisis path but at a slower than normal pace. Problems 
on the supply side and the demand side of the economy have so far led to a weaker than normal 
recovery. 
If the pace of private spending proves insufficient to assure a sustained recovery, would further 
stimulus by monetary and fiscal policy be warranted? One lesson from the Great Depression is to 
guard against a too hasty withdrawal of fiscal and monetary stimulus in an economy recovering 
from a deep decline. The removal of fiscal and monetary stimulus in 1937 is thought to have 
stopped a recovery and caused a slump that did not end until WWII. Opponents of further 
stimulus maintain that the accumulation of additional government debt would lower future 
economic growth, but supporters argue that additional stimulus is the appropriate near-term 
policy. Moreover, in 2011-2012, the sharply fading effects of fiscal stimulus and weaker growth 
in Europe have likely dampened economic growth. 
In regard to the long-term debt problem, in an economy operating close to potential output, 
government borrowing to finance budget deficits will in theory draw down the pool of national 
saving, crowding out private capital investment and slowing long-term growth. However, the U.S. 
economy is currently operating well short of capacity and the risk of such crowding out occurring 
is therefore low in the near term. Once the cyclical problem of weak demand is resolved and the 
economy has returned to a normal growth path, mainstream economists’ consensus policy 
response for an economy with a looming debt crisis is fiscal consolidation—cutting deficits. Such 
a policy would have the benefits of low and stable interest rates, a less fragile financial system, 
improved investment prospects, and possibly faster long-term growth. 
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Background 
Severity of the 2008-2009 Recession 
The 2008-2009 recession was long and deep, and according to several indicators was the most 
severe economic contraction since the 1930s (but still much less severe than the Great 
Depression). The slowdown of economic activity was moderate through the first half of 2008, but 
at that point the weakening economy was overtaken by a major financial crisis that would 
exacerbate the economic weakness and accelerate the decline.1 
When the fall of economic activity finally bottomed out in the second half of 2009, real gross 
domestic product (GDP) had contracted by approximately 5.1%, or by about $680 billion.2 At this 
point the output gap—the difference between what the economy could produce and what it 
actually produced—widened to an estimated 8.1%. The decline in economic activity was much 
sharper than in the 10 previous post-war recessions, in which the fall of real GDP averaged about 
2.0% and the output gap increased to near 4.0% (see Figure 1). However, the decline falls well 
short of the experience during the Great Depression, when real GDP decreased by 30% and the 
output gap probably exceeded 40%.3 
As output decreased the unemployment rate increased, rising from 4.6% in 2007 to a peak of 
10.1% in October 2009. The U.S. unemployment rate has not been at this level since 1982, when 
in the aftermath of the 1981 recession it reached 10.8%, the highest rate of the post-war period. 
(During the Great Depression the unemployment rate reached 25%.) This rise in the 
unemployment rate translates to about 7 million persons put out of work during the recession. 
Another 8.5 million workers have been pushed involuntarily into part-time employment.4 
The recession was intertwined with a major financial crisis that exacerbated the negative effects 
on the economy. Falling stock and house prices led to a large decline in household wealth (net 
worth), which plummeted by over $16 trillion or about 24% during 2008 and 2009. In addition, 
the financial panic led to an explosion of risk premiums (i.e., compensation to investors for 
accepting extra risk over relatively risk-free investments such as U.S. Treasury securities) that 
froze the flow of credit to the economy, crimping credit supported spending by consumers such as 
for automobiles, as well as business spending on new plant and equipment.5 
                                                 
1 See CRS Report R40007, Financial Market Turmoil and U.S. Macroeconomic Performance, by Craig K. Elwell. 
2 Real GDP is the total output, adjusted for inflation, of goods and services produced in the United States in a given 
year. 
3 Data on real GDP are available from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, at 
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp. Size of output gap is based on CRS calculations using Congressional 
Budget Office estimate of potential GDP, data for which is available at FRED Economic Data, St. Louis Fed, at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPPOT. 
4 Data on unemployment and employment are available from the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, at 
http://www.bls.gov/. 
5 Data on wealth and financial flows available at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1r-5.pdf. 
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Figure 1. Post-War Recessions 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
The negative shocks the economy received in 2008 and 2009 were, arguably, more severe than 
what occurred in 1929. However, unlike in 1929, the severe negative impulses did not turn a 
recession into a depression, arguably because timely and sizable policy responses by the 
government helped to support aggregate spending and stabilize the financial system.6 That 
stimulative economic policies would have this beneficial effect on a collapsing economy is 
consistent with standard macroeconomic theory, but without the counterfactual of the economy’s 
path in the absence of these policies, it is difficult to establish with precision how effective these 
policies were. 
Policy Responses to the Financial Crisis and Recession 
Both monetary and fiscal policies as well as some extraordinary measures were applied to counter 
the economic decline. This policy response is thought to have forestalled a more severe economic 
contraction, helping to turn the economy into the incipient economic recovery by mid-2009. 
These policies likely continued to stimulate economic activity into 2012. 
Monetary Policy Actions 
To bolster the liquidity of the financial system and stimulate the economy, during 2008 and 2009 
the Federal Reserve (Fed) aggressively applied conventional monetary stimulus by lowering the 
                                                 
6 See IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2009, Chapter 2, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/
pdf/c2.pdf; Ben J. Bernanke, Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress, before the senate Banking Committee, 
July 21,2010, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100721a.htm; and Alan S. Blinder, 
After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, The Response, and The Work Ahead, Penguin Press, January 24, 2013, 
Chapter 8. 
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federal funds rate to near zero and boldly expanding its “lender of last resort” role, creating new 
lending programs to better channel needed liquidity to the financial system and induce greater 
confidence among lenders. Following the worsening of the financial crisis in September 2008, the 
Fed grew its balance sheet by lending to the financial system. As a result, between September and 
November 2008, the Fed’s balance sheet more than doubled, increasing from under $1 trillion to 
more than $2 trillion. 
By the beginning of 2009, demand for loans from the Fed was falling as financial conditions 
normalized. Had the Fed done nothing to offset the fall in lending, the balance sheet would have 
shrunk by a commensurate amount, and some of the stimulus that it had added to the economy 
would have been withdrawn. In the spring of 2009, the Fed judged that the economy, which 
remained in a recession, still needed additional stimulus. 
On March 18, 2009, the Fed announced a commitment to purchase $300 billion of Treasury 
securities, $200 billion of Agency debt (later revised to $175 billion), and $1.25 trillion of Agency 
mortgage-backed securities.7 The Fed’s planned purchases of Treasury securities were completed 
by the fall of 2009 and planned Agency purchases were completed by the spring of 2010. At this 
point, the Fed’s balance sheet stood at just above $2 trillion.8 (Further monetary policy actions 
taken to accelerate the pace of economic recovery are discussed later in the report.) 
Fiscal Policy Actions 
Congress and the Bush Administration enacted the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-
185). This act was a $120 billion package that provided tax rebates to households and accelerated 
depreciation rules for business. Congress and the Obama Administration passed the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). This was a $787 billion package 
with $286 billion of tax cuts and $501 billion of spending increases that relative to what would 
have happened without ARRA is estimated to have raised real GDP between 1.5% and 4.2% in 
2010 but increased real GDP by progressively smaller amounts in the years that followed.9 
In terms of extraordinary measures, Congress and the Bush Administration passed the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343), creating the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). TARP authorized the Treasury to use up to $700 billion to directly bolster the capital 
position of banks or to remove troubled assets from bank balance sheets.10 
Congress was an active participant in the emergence of these policy responses and has an ongoing 
interest in macroeconomic conditions. Current macroeconomic concerns include whether the 
economic recovery will be sustained, reducing unemployment, speeding a return to normal output 
and employment growth, and addressing government’s long-term debt situation. 
                                                 
7 Agency debt and securities are issued by “government sponsored enterprises” (GSEs), such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. 
8 For further discussion of Fed actions in this period, see CRS Report RL34427, Financial Turmoil: Federal Reserve 
Policy Responses, by Marc Labonte. 
9 See CRS Report R40104, Economic Stimulus: Issues and Policies, by Jane G. Gravelle, Thomas L. Hungerford, and 
Marc Labonte. 
10 For more information on TARP, see CRS Report R41427, Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Implementation 
and Status, by Baird Webel. 
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A Sustained but Slow Economic Recovery 
The U.S. economy, as measured by real GDP growth (i.e., GDP adjusted for inflation) began to 
recover in mid-2009. However, the pace of growth over the next 3½ years was slow and uneven. 
From the second half of 2009 and through 2010 real GDP increased at an annualized rate of 2.5%. 
Compared with the early stage of previous post-war economic recoveries, this is a relatively slow 
pace and much of the economy’s upward momentum at this time was sustained by the transitory 
factors of inventory increases and fiscal stimulus. 
Therefore, sustainable recovery would depend on more enduring sources of demand such 
spending by consumers and businesses reviving to give continued momentum to the recovery. To 
a degree, this occurred, but the momentum provided has been lackluster, with the pace of growth 
decelerating to a 1.8% annualized rate, and the output gap remains sizable (see Figure 2), 
prompting recurring concerns about the recovery’s sustainability. 11 
Figure 2. Output Gap 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
While business investment spending has been relatively strong during the recovery, consumer 
spending, typically accounting for two-thirds of final demand, has been relatively weak. 
Moreover, in 2011-2012, the sharply fading effects of fiscal stimulus and weaker growth in 
Europe have likely dampened economic growth.12 Nonetheless, economic activity in the private 
economy shows signs of slow but steady improvement. 
                                                 
11 The output gap is a measure of the difference between actual output and the output the economy could produce if at 
full employment. 
12 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, at 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm. 
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• Credit conditions have improved, making getting loans easier for consumers and 
businesses, loosening a constraint on many types of credit supported 
expenditures. The Fed’s January 2013 survey of senior loan officers indicated 
that, on net, bank lending standards and terms continued to ease during the 
previous three months and that the demand for commercial and industrial loans 
had increased.13 
• The stock market has rebounded and interest rate spreads on corporate bonds 
have narrowed. The Dow Jones stock index, which had plunged to near 6500 in 
March 2009, by early 2013 had regained all of its lost capitalization. Spreads on 
investment-grade corporate bonds, a measure of the lenders’ perception of risk 
and creditworthiness of borrowers, have fallen from a high of 600 basis points in 
December 2008 to near 25 basis points in early 2013.14 
• Manufacturing activity has shown steady improvement during the recovery. 
Through February 2013, output had increased 2.0% over a year earlier. Capacity 
utilization has risen from a low of 64% in mid-2009 to 78.3% in February 2013. 
(A capacity utilization rate of 80%-85% would be typical for a fully recovered 
economy.)15 
• From mid-2009 through February 2013, non-farm payroll employment has 
increased by about 4 million jobs. Monthly gains have been consistently positive 
since late 2010, but as evidenced by a weak gain of only 88,000 jobs in March 
2013, often not at a scale characteristic of a strong recovery. However, for the 12 
months ending in March 2013, monthly employment gains have increased; 
averaging about 160,000 jobs (see Figure 3).16 
• The housing sector has recently shown evidence of improving health. Private 
new housing starts pushed above 900,000 in December 2012, most recently 
increasing at an annual rate of 917,000 units in February 2013, up from less than 
400,000 units during the recession (see Figure 4). Also, house prices have begun 
to increase, on average, up about 8% over 12 months ending January 2013.17 
                                                 
13 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Senior Loan Officers Survey on Bank Lending Practices, January 
2013, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/. 
14 Spread of 600 basis points is 6%. Data on spreads found at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=
.TEDSP%3AIND. 
15 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistical Release G.17, March 2013, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/. 
16 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, March 2013, at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/. 
17 U.S Census Bureau, New Residential Construction In February2013, joint release, March 19, 2013, at 
http://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/pdf/newresconst.pdf and S&P Case–Shiller 20-City Home Price Index, 
available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-
cashpidff—p-us. 
Economic Recovery: Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth in a Post-Crisis Economy 
 
Congressional Research Service 6 
Figure 3. Monthly Employment Net Gain or Loss 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Figure 4. Housing Starts 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau. 
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On the other hand, growth is well below the historical norm for U.S. economic recoveries as 
persistent sources of economic weakness continue to dampen economic activity. 
• Pointing to the slow pace of real GDP growth over 3½ years of recovery, the 
output gap had narrowed to only 5.8% of real GDP (see Figure 2).18 
• Consumer spending, the usual engine of a strong economic recovery, remains 
tepid, generally slowed by households’ ongoing need to rebuild substantial net 
worth lost during the recession, continued high unemployment and 
underemployment, and a surge in energy prices in the first half of 2012. 
• Employment conditions, despite improvement, remain weak. The unemployment 
rate, which had peaked at 10.0% in October 2009, has edged down to 7.6% in 
March 2013, but is still high for this stage of the economic recovery (see Figure 
5). A considerable share of the improvement in the unemployment rate is not the 
result of workers finding jobs, but by discouraged workers leaving the ranks of 
the officially unemployed by leaving the labor force. The employment to 
population ratio, which is not affected by changes in labor force participation, has 
remained near its recession low through three years of economic recovery (see 
Figure 6). 19 This suggests a labor market that, at best, is only “treading water.”  
• The housing market, although showing signs of revival, is likely to continue to 
fall short of its typical contribution to economic recoveries. Although the value of 
household’s financial assets have bounced back since 2009, the value of their real 
estate assets have not, continuing to dampen consumer spending.20 
• Growth in the UK and the Euro area has been weak and fiscal austerity measures 
to stem the growth of public debt have likely pushed the region back into 
recession, slowing growth further. Slower growth in this region, a major U.S. 
export market, has likely transmitted a contractionary impulse to the United 
States, slowing the pace of the U.S. recovery in 2012 and will likely continue to 
do so into 2013.21 
• Fiscal policy has tightened significantly since 2010, with federal government 
expenditures contracting 2.8% in 2011 and 2.2% in 2012, and exerting a 
dampening effect on economic growth.22 The current budget debate points to 
more fiscal tightening in 2013.  
                                                 
18 CRS calculation from Bureau of Economic analysis data for real GDP and CBO estimate of potential GDP both 
available from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. 
19 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, March 2013, 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/. 
20 See Atif Miam and Amir Sufi, Consumers and the Economy, Part II: Household Debt and the Weak Recovery, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, January 18, 2011. 
21 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, January 2013, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2013/update/01/index.htm. 
22 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, at 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm. 
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Figure 5. Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Figure 6. Employment Population Ratio 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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The Shape of Economic Recovery 
In the typical post-war business cycle, lower than normal growth of aggregate demand during the 
recession is quickly followed by a recovery period with above normal growth of spending, 
perhaps spurred by some degree of monetary and fiscal stimulus. The degree of acceleration of 
growth in the first two to three years of recovery has varied across post-war business cycles, but 
has been at an annual pace in a range of 4% to 8%.23 This above normal growth brings the 
economy back more quickly to the pre-recession growth path, and speeds up the reentry of the 
unemployed to the workforce. 
Once the level of aggregate demand approaches the level of potential GDP (or full employment), 
the economy returns to its pre-recession growth path, where the growth of aggregate spending is 
slower because it is constrained by the growth of aggregate supply, which in recent years is 
estimated to have been at an annual pace of near 3.0%. (A subsequent section of the report looks 
more closely at aggregate supply.)24 
There is concern, however, that this time the U.S. economy, without supporting stimulus from 
policy actions, will either not return to its pre-recession growth path, perhaps remain permanently 
below it, or return to the pre-crisis path but at a slower than normal pace, or worse, dip into a 
second recession. Below normal growth would almost certainly translate into below normal 
recovery of employment, whereas a second round of recession could increase the already high 
unemployment rate. The next sections of this report discuss problems on the supply side and the 
demand side of the economy that could lead to a weaker than normal recovery. 
Demand Side Problems? 
Much of the vigor that occurred on the demand side of the economy in 2009 and 2010 appears to 
have come from fiscal stimulus and business inventory restocking. Fiscal stimulus and inventory 
rebuilding are, however, temporary sources of support of aggregate spending. Sooner or later 
fiscal stimulus falls away. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that fiscal stimulus 
peaked in 2010, provided a smaller boost to demand in 2011, and continued to diminish to a 
negligible force by the end of 2012.25 Inventory building is a self-limiting process that will not go 
on indefinitely; stock-building was weaker during most of 2011, and despite a stronger turn in 
late 2011 and early 2012, inventory growth will unlikely continue to have a major positive effect 
on aggregate demand. 
A strong recovery of private sector demand, including consumer spending, investment spending, 
and exports, is required to sustain an economic recovery that brings the economy quickly back to 
its pre-recession growth path and unemployment rate. However, there are major uncertainties 
about the potential medium-term strength of each of these components that could dampen 
aggregate spending and constrain the economy’s ability to generate a recovery period with above 
normal growth and quickly falling unemployment. 
                                                 
23 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, at http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp. 
24 The long-term growth of aggregate supply is determined by the growth in the supplies of capital and labor and on the 
growth in production technology used to turn capital and labor into goods and services. 
25 The Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2020, January 2012, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42905. 
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Consumption Spending 
Personal consumption expenditures historically constitute the largest and most stable component 
of aggregate spending in the U.S. economy. During the first three post-war decades, personal 
consumption spending averaged a 62% share of GDP. However, that share rose significantly over 
the next three decades, averaging about 65% in the 1980s, 67% during the 1990s, and about 70% 
between 2001 and 2007. The high level of household spending reached during the 2001-2007 
expansion is unlikely to reemerge during the current recovery because it was supported by an 
unsustainable increase in household debt, a decrease in personal savings, ease of access to credit, 
and lower energy prices. 
Household Debt 
In the mid-1980s, after a long period of relative stability at a scale of around 45% to 50% of GDP, 
the debt level of households began to rise steadily, reaching over 100% of GDP by 2008. Such a 
substantial rise in the level of household debt was sustainable so long as rising home prices and a 
rising stock market continued to also increase the value of household net worth, and interest rates 
remained low, countering the rise in the burden of debt service as a share of income. 
The collapse of the housing and stock markets in 2008 and 2009 substantially decreased 
household net worth, which had, by mid-2009, fallen about $16 trillion below its 2007 peak of 
nearly $67 trillion.26 This near 25% fall in net worth pushed the household debt burden up 
substantially. Unlike in earlier post-war recoveries, the need of households to repair their 
damaged balance sheets induced a large diversion of current income from consumption spending 
to debt reduction.27 Since 2008, households have reduced their outstanding debt about $1 trillion. 
28 If debt reduction continues in 2013, it is likely to be a continuing drag on the pace of economic 
recovery. 
A substantial rebuilding of household net worth has occurred during the recovery. Through the 
fourth quarter of 2012, household net worth has increased by about $15 trillion from its 2009 
trough, reaching about $66 trillion and recovering nearly 95% of what was lost during the 
recession. This improvement has occurred largely on the asset side of the household balance sheet 
and primarily for financial assets due to the rise of the stock market from its low point in early 
2009.29 Such gains tend to be concentrated in higher-income households and not a major source 
of wealth for the average household. Traditionally, rising home equity, largely dependent on the 
path of house prices, has been the major contributor to household wealth. The rapid rise of home 
prices during the last economic expansion caused an equally rapid rise in home equity. 
Consumers borrowed against this equity to fund current spending. With the sharp fall of home 
prices, home equity was reduced substantially, erasing that source of funding. Home prices are 
only now beginning to rise and the housing market is expected to remain relatively weak for 
                                                 
26 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Flow of Funds Accounts,” Table B.100, March 7, 2013, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/. 
27 See Evan Tanner and Yassar Abdih, “Rebuilding U.S. Wealth,” Finance & Development, IMF, December 2009 at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/12/tanner.htm. 
28 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Flow of Funds Accounts,” Table B.100, March 7, 2013, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1r-5.pdf. 
29 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Flow of Funds Accounts,” Table B.100, March 7, 2013, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1r-5.pdf. 
Economic Recovery: Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth in a Post-Crisis Economy 
 
Congressional Research Service 11 
several more years, slowing the pace of households rebuilding this component of their net worth, 
and continuing to dampen the pace consumer spending (see Figure 7). 30 
In addition to diverting more personal income to saving, a continued weak labor market is likely 
to dampen income growth and, in turn, slow the recovery of consumer spending. 
Figure 7. Household Equity in Real Estate 
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Credit Conditions 
Easy credit availability in the pre-crisis economy enabled households to readily borrow against 
their rising home equity to fund added spending. Financial innovations allowed lenders to keep 
interest rates low and offer liberal terms and conditions to entice households to borrow. Many 
believe that credit conditions will remain tighter during the current expansion. Interest rates are 
still historically low, but banks greatly tightened the terms and conditions of consumer loans 
during the crisis and recession and have only slowly relaxed them as the recovery has proceeded. 
While not likely as important a driver of higher savings as high household debt, tighter credit 
conditions will make it less likely that households will exploit any increase in their home equity 
to fund current spending, further constraining consumer spending relative to what occurred 
during the 2001-2007 economic expansion. 
                                                 
30 The standard model of consumer spending used in economic analysis assumes that consumers seek to avoid large 
swings in their living standards over the course of their lifetimes. Thus as incomes rise and fall both in the short and 
long term, individuals are expected to vary their saving rate in order to minimize the effect on their consumption. If 
consumers seek to maintain a fairly stable level of consumption over their entire lives, then the level of consumption at 
any given point in their lives will depend on their current wealth and some expectation about their income over the rest 
of their lives. See Annamaria Lusardi, Jonathan Skinner, and Steven Venti, “Saving Puzzles and Saving Policies in the 
United States,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 8237, April 2001. 
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Personal Saving 
The U.S. personal saving rate averaged about 10% of GDP consistently through the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s. Subsequently, the personal saving rate declined sharply, reaching a low of 1.0% by 
2005.31 It is likely that the reduction of household saving was in large measure a consequence of 
the sizable increase in household net worth associated with increased house prices and stock 
prices occurring at that time. As wealth rose rapidly, it was less urgent to divert current income to 
saving. 
The sharp reduction of household net worth during the recent recession dramatically changed the 
financial circumstances of households, reducing the use of debt-financed spending. The need to 
repair household balance sheets induced households to pay down debt. The poor prospect for the 
appreciation of house prices has eliminated the ability to use rising equity as a substitute for 
saving. 
In addition, the increase in economic uncertainty in the aftermath of the financial crisis and 
recession will likely mean that over the medium term, households could continue to be more 
inclined to save. As the economic decline intensified, the personal saving rate increased, climbing 
from 3.5% of GDP in 2007 to 6.1% of GDP at the bottom of the recession in 2009.32 However, 
with economic recovery the personal saving rate has fallen, averaging about 3.8% in 2012. The 
passing of the dire financial and economic circumstances that prevailed in 2008 and 2009 has 
likely led to some of the recent moderation in households’ saving behavior. A lower rate of saving 
enables higher rates of consumption, but it is uncertain that continued fall of the saving rate will 
be a substantial source of support for current spending by households.  
Energy Prices 
A 30% increase in the price of oil from October 2011 through April 2012 adversely affected 
household budgets and likely contributed to the slow rate of increase in consumer spending over 
the same period.33 In the short run, the U.S. demand for energy is relatively inelastic, with little 
curtailment of energy use in the face of the rising price. As households and businesses spend 
more for energy, which is largely imported, they tend to spend less on domestic output, slowing 
economic growth.34 Since April 2012, the price of oil decreased and appears to have stabilized at 
about 10% below this peak. If it remains near the current level, the dampening effect on economic 
growth is likely to fade. In addition, increasing supplies of shale gas have resulted in lower 
natural gas prices, which may benefit household budgets. 
                                                 
31 See CRS Report R40647, The Fall and Rise of Household Saving, by Brian W. Cashell. 
32 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 5.1, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N. 
33 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum; Weekly Spot Price, July 2012, at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/
hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RCLC1&f=D. 
34 Research indicates that a $10 increase in the per barrel price of oil sustained for two years is likely to reduce real 
GDP growth relative to base-line by 0.2 percentage points in the first year and 0.5 percentage points in the second year. 
See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Economic Effects of High Oil Prices, 2006, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/
otheranalysis/aeo_2006analysispapers/efhop.html. 
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Slow Recovery of Consumer Spending? 
If consumer spending continues its slow paced recovery, then for the U.S. economy to return to 
its normal pre-crisis growth path, an improved pace of GDP growth will have to come from other 
components of aggregate demand: investment spending, net exports, or government spending. 
Investment Spending 
Investment spending is the third-largest component of aggregate spending, historically averaging 
17% to 18% of GDP in years of near normal output growth. (Government spending is second 
largest at about 20%.) Historically, the largest portion of total investment spending is business 
fixed investment, its share averaging 11% to 12% of GDP in periods of normal growth. The 
second component of total investment is residential investment (i.e., new housing), averaging 4% 
to 5% of GDP. 
Investment spending is very sensitive to economic conditions and more volatile than consumer 
spending. This sensitivity is at least in part because investment projects are often postponable to a 
time when economic conditions are more favorable. Its volatility makes investment spending an 
important determinant of the amplitude, down and up, of the typical business cycle.35 
As aggregate spending fell and credit availability tightened in 2008, investment spending quickly 
weakened. As a share of real GDP, investment spending fell from about 16% in 2007 to about 
11% at the economy’s trough in 2009. The sharp fall in real GDP from the second quarter of 2008 
through the first quarter of 2009 was nearly fully accounted for by the sharp fall of investment 
spending over this same period. Throughout the economic recovery, investment spending has 
been a leading source of economic growth, elevating its share of real GDP to 12.7% in 2010, 
13.5% in 2011, and 14% in 2012.36 
In particular, the equipment and software component of nonresidential investment has been the 
principal source of business spending strength and an important contributor to the pace of the 
economic recovery. Equipment and software spending increased 14.6% in 2010, contributing 
nearly a full percentage point to the growth of real GDP in that year. This category of business 
investment spending continued to be an important source of economic growth in 2011, increasing 
at an annual rate of 11.0% and contributing 0.7 percentage points to real GDP growth. However, 
in 2012, investment spending on equipment and software slowed, advancing at a 6.9% annual rate 
and contributing 0.5 percentage points to real GDP growth.37 
Typically, this same sensitivity also works in the opposite direction. Strongly rising investment 
spending, responding to improving market demand, reduced uncertainty, and expanding credit 
availability, often gives an above normal contribution to the rebound of aggregate spending 
during the recovery phase of the business cycle. 
Looking forward, however, some significant constraints on both residential and business 
investment raise uncertainty about whether investment spending will continue to be a strong 
                                                 
35 Ibid., Table 1.1.5. 
36 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.5, 
athttp://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp. 
37 Ibid., Table 1.1.5, at http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp. 
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contributor to economic recovery, and therefore, whether it could be a component of aggregate 
spending capable of compensating for a weaker than normal recovery of spending by consumers. 
The principal constraint on residential investment has been the large inventory of vacant housing, 
left over from the 2002-2006 housing boom. It is estimated that the number of vacancies could be 
more than 2 million units above what would normally be expected at this stage of the business 
cycle.38 As discussed above, the housing market has recently shown signs of stabilizing, and 
residential investment spending has risen strongly in 2012, albeit from a very low base. On 
balance new house construction is likely to remain relatively weak for the next two years while 
the inventory overhang continues to be worked down. 
The prospect for nonresidential investment is likely to be better than for residential investment, 
but it is not clear that with economic recovery nonresidential investment will exceed its pre-crisis 
level. On the supply side, capacity utilization rates have climbed back from record lows of below 
70% reached during the recession, but, at about 78% currently, are still only near the lows 
reached in the 1990 and the 2001 recessions and well short of the 80% to 85% that would 
typically correspond to operating near or at capacity.39 On the demand side, business investment 
in new plants and equipment is most often a response to the expectation of increased demand for 
the products they produce. The main driver of that demand is consumer spending and, as 
discussed above, that spending has been tepid, with the not unlikely prospect that it may continue 
to be weak over the near term if households have made a lasting commitment to increased 
savings. 
Stronger foreign demand could also stimulate investment spending and in theory compensate for 
the weaker pull of domestic demand, but as discussed more fully below, foreign demand may also 
be weak. Also, problems in the financial sector have caused sharply reduced activity in 
commercial real estate, contributing to persistent weakness in business investment spending on 
structures.40 
In general, it seems questionable whether total investment spending would provide the offset to a 
below normal contribution of consumption spending to economic growth over the near term. 
Net Exports 
The U.S. trade deficit (real net exports) shrank from about 6% of real GDP in 2006 to below 3% 
in 2009. Since the beginning of the recession in late 2007 through the end of the contraction in 
mid-2009, net exports have made a significant positive contribution to real GDP in an otherwise 
declining economy. Even as economic weakness abroad caused U.S. exports to fall, imports fell 
by more, providing a net positive push to current economic activity.41 
                                                 
38 U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Home Ownership, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/
historic/. 
39 Data for capacity utilization are available at Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Industrial 
Production and Capacity Utilization, Table G17, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/. 
40 Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.5, at http://www.bea.gov/national/
index.htm#gdp. 
41 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.6, at 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1. 
Economic Recovery: Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth in a Post-Crisis Economy 
 
Congressional Research Service 15 
The 3 percentage point swing in real net exports is, however, largely the consequence of the 
severe economic weakness in the United States over this period. Since mid-2009, the deficit in 
net exports has decreased very little, falling slightly to 2.9% of real GDP in 2012. This relatively 
flat performance means that over the course of the current recovery net exports have not had 
either a substantial positive or negative impact on economic growth. This neutral pattern makes it 
uncertain that net exports can be expected to boost aggregate spending sufficiently to offset weak 
consumption over the medium term and help assure a sustained recovery at a pace that steadily 
reduces unemployment. 
Boosting U.S. Net Exports Through a Rebalancing of Global Spending 
Increasing U.S. net exports to any degree requires that the trade deficit continues to decrease. For 
that to happen, trade surpluses of the rest of the world with the United States must also decrease. 
To achieve this adjustment of trade flows, a sizable rebalancing of domestic and external demand 
on the part of the deficit and surplus economies would need to occur.42 
Because a trade deficit is a consequence of an economy spending more than it produces, 
rebalancing in this circumstance requires a decrease of domestic spending and increase of 
domestic saving. In contrast, for overseas trade partners, because a trade surplus is a consequence 
of an economy spending less than it produces, rebalancing in this circumstance requires an 
increase of trade partner domestic spending and decrease in trade partner domestic saving. 
This rebalancing of spending will put pressure on the dollar to depreciate and foreign currencies 
to appreciate. A fall in the value of the dollar relative to the currencies of the surplus countries 
causes the price of foreign goods to rise for U.S. buyers and the price of U.S. goods to fall for 
foreign buyers. This change in the relative price of foreign versus domestic goods will cause the 
net exports of the United States to rise, giving the boost in spending needed to potentially offset 
reduced consumption spending. The change in relative prices would also cause the net exports of 
surplus countries to fall as more of current output is absorbed by increased domestic spending. 
In the United States, as discussed above, some measure of rebalancing seems to be occurring, as 
evidenced by the increase in the personal saving rate above its pre-recession low. Although there 
are good reasons to expect this increase to be sustained, there is the possibility that households 
would eventually revert to their pre-crisis low saving patterns. However, even if household saving 
remains higher, it is likely that any significant increase in the overall U.S. national saving rate 
would also require an increase in government saving via smaller federal budget deficits. 
Large U.S. budget deficits over the near term are providing a needed boost to weak aggregate 
spending during the early stages of an economic recovery. With the strengthening of private 
spending as the recovery matures, large government budget deficits would fade away, causing 
government saving to rise. What puts this fading away of budget deficits in doubt over the long 
term is the prospect of having to fund the obligations attached to the rising demand of an aging 
U.S. population for healthcare, Social Security, and other entitlements. Without policy actions to 
address these long-term demands, it is not clear how the long-term budget deficits will fall. 
                                                 
42 On global rebalancing, see for example, Olivier Blanchard, “Sustaining Global Recovery,” International Monetary 
Fund, September 2009, “Rebalancing,” The Economist, March 31, 2010, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/
2009/09/index.htm, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice-chairman Donald L. Kohn, Speech 
“Global Imbalances,” May 11, 2010, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20100511a.htm. 
Economic Recovery: Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth in a Post-Crisis Economy 
 
Congressional Research Service 16 
Effective global rebalancing arguably also involves sizable adjustments by the largest surplus 
economies—Germany, Japan, and China. However, there are significant potential constraints on 
how substantially each of these three economies can “save less and spend more,” perhaps limiting 
any sizable appreciation of their currencies relative to the dollar, and any associated boost in U.S. 
net exports. 
The inability of Germany to move its exchange rate independently from the other Euro area 
economies reduces its flexibility of adjustment. In addition, the effects of the 2008-2009 
recession have left limited room for further fiscal expansion and small ability to lower the 
household saving rate. In addition, the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has 
dampened growth prospects in Germany, likely weakening the demand for U.S. exports. Although 
its level of debt is not high, recent German policy actions have stressed fiscal consolidation, 
tending to increase saving and dampen spending.43 Japan, which does have a very high level of 
public debt, has little to no room for fiscal expansion and a poor prospect of boosting household 
spending. Moreover, both Germany and Japan, faced with substantial near-term economic 
weakness in the aftermath of the global recession, may take steps to avoid the dampening of their 
net exports that a sizable appreciation of the exchange rate would cause. 
China has the largest bilateral trade surplus with the United States and therefore has the potential 
to have a large impact on U.S. export sales and through that a significant positive impulse on the 
pace of the U.S. economic recovery. Also, economic growth has remained relatively strong in 
China through the recent global financial crisis and recession, and aggregate demand is expected 
to be strong through the next two to three years. What is uncertain, however, is whether a greater 
share of this spending will be domestic demand, particularly consumption spending by Chinese 
households. 
The very high rate of saving by Chinese households is thought to be a precautionary measure to 
compensate for a lack of social insurance. It likely also reflects limited access to consumer credit. 
The difficulty for the near-term task of sustaining economic recovery is that even if policy actions 
are taken to remove these constraints on consumer spending, households are likely to only 
gradually change their pattern of consumption and not provide a sharp near-term boost to 
domestic spending. 
Also, a closer look at the sources of increase in China’s domestic saving over the last decade 
reveals that the principal contributor to that growth was Chinese companies, not households. 
Therefore, changing the saving practices of Chinese companies is likely to be an important aspect 
of any large increase in China’s saving rate. It is argued by some that Chinese companies retain 
too large a share of their earnings. Better access to credit and changes in the governance rules of 
Chinese business would likely reduce the business saving rate. But, as with households, even if 
such policy initiatives are forthcoming, the change in the business saving rate is likely to emerge 
only gradually.44 
                                                 
43 OECD, Restoring Public Finances, Country Notes: Germany, 2010, at http://www.oecd.org/gov/
budgetingandpublicexpenditures/47840777.pdf. 
44 Of course, for these reforms to translate into a shift in China’s trade balance, that nation must be willing to allow its’ 
exchange rate to rise relative to the dollar, causing a decrease in the price of foreign goods relative to domestic goods, 
and exerting downward pressure on China’s trade surplus. From July 2005 to February 2009, China abandoned its 
dollar peg, allowing the yuan to appreciate by 28% (on a real trade-weighted basis). However, faced with weakening 
export sales due to the global financial crisis China for the last 10 months has re-pegged the yuan to the dollar. China’s 
export-led growth model, relying on a high saving rate (to keep internal demand low) and a low exchange rate pegged 
(continued...) 
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Even with a successful rebalancing, it is unlikely that China alone can propel a boost in U.S. net 
exports sufficient to offset weak domestic demand and pace economic recovery. China’s global 
trade surplus is estimated to be about 10% of GDP. However, China is only about one-third the 
size of the U.S. economy. Therefore, if China’s trade were only with the United States, it would 
have to reduce its trade surplus by 3% of GDP to effect a 1 percentage point reduction of the U.S. 
trade deficit. But since, in fact, only about 16% of China’s trade is with the United States, it 
would take a 15 percentage point change in China’s trade balance (moving from a surplus equal 
to 10% of GDP to a deficit equal to 5% of GDP) to reduce the U.S. trade deficit by 1 percentage 
point. (This assumes that the fall of China’s trade surplus is not offset by an increase of other 
trading partners’ surpluses.) 
Other emerging Asian economies also run trade surpluses, and adding these to the calculation 
makes the relative scale of rebalancing needed to achieve a given amount of improvement in the 
U.S trade deficit more feasible. However, all of emerging Asia is only about half the size of the 
U.S. economy. Therefore, if the U.S. share of the whole region’s trade is similar to China’s, 
emerging Asia would need to accomplish a sizable 7 percentage point change in its trade balance 
to generate a 1 percentage point change in the U.S. trade balance. As with China, for a reduction 
of the trade surpluses of other emerging Asian economies to happen quickly, their currencies will 
need to appreciate against the dollar. 
All in all, there are reasons to doubt whether U.S. net exports can increase over the near term at a 
pace sufficient to fully compensate for the prospect of slower than normal growth of other 
components of U.S. domestic spending. 
Supply Side Problems? 
The supply side of the economy governs its capacity for producing goods and services. That 
capacity is a function of the economy’s supplies of labor and capital and the level of technology 
used to turn labor and capital into the output of goods and services. In the short run, the potential 
supplies of these productive factors are relatively fixed and will determine the economy’s 
potential output. In periods of economic slack, rising aggregate demand can increase the 
economy’s output and employment up to the level of potential output, which corresponds with 
full employment. 
In the long run, as the supplies of capital and labor and the level of technology increase, the level 
of potential output also increases. Over time the steady rise of potential output will define the 
economy’s long-term growth path (called the “trend” growth rate). When aggregate demand is 
below potential output the economy can grow faster than trend growth, but when the level of 
aggregate demand reaches the level of potential output, further growth of output will be 
constrained to the trend growth rate. 
Typically the long-run growth path is thought to be relatively stable and not greatly affected by 
recessions and the associated short-term fluctuations in aggregate demand. Over the post-war 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
to the dollar (to keep external demand high), has been very successful and, despite the possible advantages of reforms 
to boost domestic demand, it is uncertain whether China would move substantially away from this model. 
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period, the average annual growth rate of potential output for the United States has been 3.4%; 
however, since the 1970s it has averaged closer to 3.0%.45 
An analysis by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) examines the question of whether output 
will return to its pre-crisis trend.46 It examines the medium-term and long-run paths of output 
after 88 banking crises over the past four decades in a wide range of countries (including both 
advanced and developing economies). A key conclusion was that seven years after the crisis, 
output had declined relative to trend by nearly 10% for the average country. But there was 
considerable variation of outcomes across crisis episodes. 
In other words, such crises not only reduce actual output, but also may reduce potential output 
(the economy’s structural and institutional capacity to produce output). In this circumstance, the 
economy could return to its trend growth rate, but there is unlikely to be a rebound period of 
above normal growth to quickly return the economy to its pre-crisis potential output and growth 
path and, in turn, quickly reduce unemployment. This failure to return to the pre-crisis potential 
output means that the economy bears the burden of a permanent output loss and the large initial 
increase in the unemployment rate caused by the crisis could persist even as the economy is 
growing at its trend rate. 
The IMF analysis suggests that the reduction of the post-crisis growth path is likely to be the 
consequence of decreases of approximately equal size in the employment rate, the capital-labor 
ratio, and productivity. The adverse effect of the financial crisis on the employment rate is 
thought to arise from an increase in the “structural unemployment rate,” hampering the post-crisis 
economy’s ability to accomplish the needed reallocation of labor from sectors that have 
contracted permanently to sectors that are expanding. 
Because the aftermath of the crisis will likely involve sizable changes in the composition of the 
economy, it likely also increases the mismatch between the skills of the unemployed and the skills 
demanded in the post-crisis labor market—job vacancies go unfilled for lack of a worker with 
sufficient skills for the job.47 Also, labor force participation rates may fall if the crisis is severe 
enough to substantially increase the numbers of the long-term unemployed, some of whom may 
become discouraged from searching for a new job. A crisis-induced fall of house prices and a 
rising incidence of mortgages with negative equity will also discourage the geographic mobility 
of workers who are unable to sell their houses. 
The adverse impact of a financial crisis on capital accumulation is likely the combined outcome 
of several factors. Decreased demand for products and heightened uncertainty of potential return 
dampens the incentive to invest. In addition, the financial crisis could impede the process of 
                                                 
45 The Congressional Budget Office, Key Assumptions in Projecting Potential Output, August 2012, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43541. 
46 P. Kannan, A. Scott, and M. Terrones, “From Recession to Recovery: How Soon and How Strong?,” in World 
Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, April 2009, pp. 103-138. Also see Davide Furceri and Annabelle 
Mourougane, The Effect of Financial Crisis on Potential Output: New Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries, 
OECD Economics Department, Working Paper no. 699, May 2009. 
47 Employment in construction, financial services, and some types of manufacturing may remain depressed for some 
time, requiring some who lose their jobs in those sectors to seek employment in other sectors. See also CRS Report 
R41785, The Increase in Unemployment Since 2007: Is It Cyclical or Structural?, by Linda Levine, which suggests that 
most of current U.S. unemployment is cyclical. 
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financial intermediation for up to several years, as weakened balance sheets, lower collateral 
values, and elevated risk premiums slow the flow of credit and elevate the real cost of borrowing. 
The dampening effect on productivity may occur as higher risk premiums and a generally more 
cautious approach to spending by businesses diminish the willingness and ability to finance 
relatively high-risk projects. Expenditures on research and development are typically pro-cyclical 
and likely to be sharply reduced in times of crisis. 
Productivity tends to recover quickly after recessions and thus allows the economy to resume 
growth at the pre-crisis trend rate. However, the capital and employment losses tend to endure 
and keep the economy on a lower growth path. 
Has the recent financial crisis caused a reduction in the potential output of the U.S. economy and 
placed it on a lower trend growth path? It is difficult to make a concurrent determination because 
potential output is not directly observable, and can only be imputed from the economy’s actual 
post-crisis performance. A clear determination of any such permanent output loss is some years in 
the future. 
Although the IMF study gives reasons why the financial crisis possibly could have adversely 
affected the economy’s supply side, the study also finds that there can be some significant 
mitigating factors that could be particularly relevant for the U.S. economy. First, a high pre-crisis 
investment share is a good predictor of a large potential output loss. This is a reflection of the 
high sensitivity of investment to the negative effects of a financial crisis. For the United States 
there was no sharp increase in investment spending above trend as measured as a share of GDP 
for the three years prior to the financial crisis, averaging near a typical 16% of GDP.48 
Second, the IMF study also found that those economies that aggressively apply stimulative fiscal 
and monetary policies during the crisis tend to have smaller medium-term output losses. As 
already discussed, the United States has applied quickly and substantially stimulative polices in 
response to the financial crisis. 
Third, countries with fewer labor market rigidities suffered smaller medium-term output losses. 
U.S. labor markets, as compared with other advanced economies, are relatively free of labor 
market rigidities, though as mentioned declining house prices may have reduced mobility of some 
workers who own their own homes. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) currently projects U.S. potential output to increase at an 
annual average rate of 2.2% for the 2013-2018 period, the same pace as during the 2002-2012 
period. CBO’s projected rate of growth of potential output is well below the post-war average of 
3.3%. Slower growth of potential GDP is largely the consequence of a projection of significantly 
slower labor force growth than during the post-war period in the coming decades. Most of the 
slowdown in labor force growth is related to long-term demographic changes forced by an aging 
population; however, a protracted recession with growing numbers of long-term unemployed and 
discouraged workers has also contributed to this labor force dynamic.49 
                                                 
48 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.6, at 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1. 
49 The Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, August 2012, Table 2-3, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=12316. 
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Policy Responses to Increase the Pace of Economic Recovery 
The momentum of the current economic recovery has been assisted by injections of fiscal and 
monetary stimulus. But with substantial economic slack remaining and with unemployment still 
stubbornly high, would further stimulus by monetary and fiscal policy be warranted to sustain 
economic recovery? 
Fiscal Policy Actions Taken During the Recovery 
In 2010, many economists argued that another dose of fiscal stimulus was warranted because the 
effects of the first stimulus package were beginning to fade, and because of evidence that private 
spending lacked sufficient vigor to sustain a healthy recovery.50 In this situation, the risk of not 
applying further fiscal stimulus could be several years of sub-normal growth, or worse, dipping 
into a second recession. 
In response to concerns that the recovery was faltering, Congress passed and President Obama 
signed in December 2010 the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312). The essential features of that measure were an extension for 
two years of the “Bush” tax cuts, a 2 percentage point cut in the payroll tax during 2011, a 13-
month extension of unemployment benefits, and allowance for more rapid expensing of business 
investment in 2011. The CBO estimated that the direct stimulative effect of these revenue and 
spending changes as measured by the increase in the federal budget deficit would be 
approximately $374 billion in 2011 and $422 billion in 2012.51  
A major counterforce to federal stimulus policies during this recovery has been the contraction of 
spending by state and local governments. Direct expenditures by state and local governments 
decreased 1.8% in 2010, 3.4%% in 2011, and 1.4% in 2012, and subtracting from real GDP 
growth 0.2 percentage points in 2010, 0.4 percentage points in 2011, and 0.2 percentage points in 
2012.52 
In 2013, federal fiscal policy has reversed course and tightened, exerting a drag on the recovery. 
This fiscal tightening results from automatic spending cuts, enacted by the Budget Control Act of 
2011(P.L. 112-25), and the expiration at the end of 2012 of the 2 percentage point cut in payroll 
taxes and of tax rate cuts for incomes above certain thresholds. CBO estimates that this fiscal 
tightening will cause economic growth in 2013 to be 1.5 percentage points below what it 
otherwise would be.53 
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Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/
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53 The Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook:Fiscal Years2013 to 2023, February 5, 2013, 
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Evaluating the Case for Fiscal Stimulus 
Fiscal stimulus is not without its critics. The case against more fiscal stimulus comes in three 
forms, used separately or in combination: one, no further stimulus is needed; two, fiscal stimulus 
does not work; and three, stimulus increases the budget deficit, makes the U.S. long-term debt 
problem worse, and dampens economic growth.54 
In regard to the need for stimulus, the U.S. economy does have strong recuperative powers and it 
is possible that private spending and economic growth will soon surge without further fiscal 
stimulus. Events such as improved consumer confidence, lower energy prices, a more normal 
flow of credit, or faster growth in the rest of the world could separately or in combination induce 
stronger spending by households and businesses. However, given the severity of the recent 
recession and, as outlined above, given the current weakness of private spending and the several 
economic obstacles that households and businesses will probably continue to face over the near 
term, there remains a significant risk of sub-normal growth for the next several years. 
In regard to the ability of fiscal stimulus to boost output and employment, some economists argue 
that fiscal stimulus only shifts spending, it does not increase spending. In this view, when people 
see the government running a budget deficit, they anticipate that the government will need to 
increase taxes in the future to pay off the debt. This anticipation causes households and 
businesses to increase their current savings to pay for the higher taxes. The increase in saving 
tends to offset the stimulative effect of the budget deficit.55 There is little empirical support for 
this theory, however. Mainstream economic analysis indicates that in circumstances like the 
present, in which the economy’s output is likely constrained by insufficient demand, fiscal 
stimulus can raise the level of output and employment.56 
In regard to the long-term debt problem, it is often pointed out that for an economy operating 
close to potential output, government borrowing to finance budget deficits will draw down the 
pool of national saving, leaving less available to support private capital investment. Private 
investment by business and households in education, housing, research and development, and 
capital equipment that would have otherwise occurred is in theory “crowded out” through higher 
interest rates bid up by government borrowing. If budget deficits divert national saving from 
private investment, other things equal, future productivity and income growth may be slowed. 
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However, the U.S. economy is currently operating well short of capacity and market interest rates 
are generally at or near historical lows, making the risk of such “crowding out” occurring and 
damaging future economic growth not seem immediate.57 Another variant of this argument 
against fiscal stimulus maintains that by increasing public debt, fiscal stimulus undermines 
household and business confidence and causes them to postpone current spending. In this view, 
contrary to mainstream economic thinking, shrinking the deficit would, by improving confidence, 
actually stimulate current spending by consumers and business.58 
The Short-Term and Long-Term Fiscal Problems 
Because the United States faces two macroeconomic problems, two policy responses are, 
arguably, appropriate: a short-term policy to sustain a cyclical recovery of economic growth and a 
long-term policy to trim government debt. Conceptually there is no necessary tradeoff between 
these two objectives. They can be mutually reinforcing: a credible commitment to dealing with 
the long-term debt problem allays investor uncertainty and increases the near-term incentive to 
spend, while effectively dealing with the short-term problem of weak aggregate demand puts the 
economy on a stronger growth path, which boosts tax revenue and eases the long-term debt 
problem. 
Once the short-term problem of weak demand is solved and the economy has returned to a normal 
growth path, the appropriate policy response for an economy with a looming debt crisis is 
arguably fiscal consolidation—cutting deficits. Such a policy is thought to have the benefits of 
low and stable interest rates, a less fragile financial system, improved investment prospects, and 
possibly faster long-term growth. 
To address the government’s long-term fiscal problem, Congress passed on August 2, 2011, the 
Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). The Budget Control Act (BCA) sets caps on 
discretionary spending. It also created the Congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit 
Reduction, whose task was to propose further policy changes that would lead to $1.5 trillion in 
further deficit reduction over 10 years. The joint committee was unable to reach an agreement on 
how to achieve further deficit reduction. In the absence of an agreement, the BCA established a 
process for automatic spending reduction.59 
Monetary Policy Actions Taken During the Recovery 
On November 3, 2010, the Fed announced that it would provide more monetary stimulus by 
means of the purchase an additional $600 billion of Treasury securities at a pace of about $75 
billion per month, and continue the practice of replacing maturing securities with Treasury 
security purchases. When this second round of monetary stimulus (sometimes referred to as 
“quantitative easing 2” or QE2)60 was completed in June 2011, the Fed had increased the size of 
                                                 
57 For discussion of the long-term debt issue, see President Obama’s National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and 
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its balance sheet to more than $2.5 trillion. The maturity lengths of the securities purchased were 
mostly between 2½ and 10 years.61 
The Fed argued at that time that a second dose of monetary stimulus was needed because 
economic growth is decelerating and much of what economic momentum existed was being 
provided by the transitory factors of inventory adjustment and fiscal stimulus. In the second half 
of 2010, growth slowed to around 2%, a pace barely fast enough to keep the unemployment rate 
from rising. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke indicated that of particular concern was the substantial 
increase in the share of the long-term unemployed (workers who have been without work for six 
months or more). Such long-term unemployment tends to convert temporary cyclical 
unemployment into more intractable structural unemployment. In addition, the lingering 
economic slack in the economy had added to deflationary pressure. Measures of core inflation 
had been decelerating during 2010, reaching a low of only slightly above 1%. A continuous 
decline in the price level is troublesome because in a weak or contracting economy it can lead to a 
damaging, self-reinforcing, downward spiral of prices and economic activity. Deflation 
exacerbated the economy’s decline during the Great Depression.62 
To support a stronger recovery, the Fed announced on September 21, 2011, that it would purchase 
by the end of June 2012 $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years 
to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years 
or less.63 In June 2012, the Fed announced that it would extend this program through the end of 
2012. This program does not expand the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. Rather, by changing the 
composition of its asset holdings toward longer maturities, the Fed is attempting to put downward 
pressure on longer-term interest rates and increase monetary policy’s stimulative effect on 
economic activity.64 
On September 13, 2012, the Fed announced a third round of quantitative easing, or QE3. Pointing 
to slow economic growth and an unemployment rate that has not improved since the beginning of 
the year, the Fed expressed concern that “without further policy accommodation, economic 
growth might not be strong enough to generate sustained improvement in labor market 
conditions.”65 QE3 will increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency 
mortgaged-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month, which together with its “maturity 
extension program” to increase the average maturity of its asset holdings as announced in June, 
will increase the Fed’s holdings of long-term assets by about $85 billion per month through the 
end of 2012. Moreover, in a significant change from the earlier rounds of quantitative easing, the 
QE3 mortgage-backed security purchases are open-ended, meaning that the Fed is committing to 
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continuing the program until labor market conditions improve. The Fed also gave further 
“forward guidance” by announcing that it intends to keep the federal funds interest rates at 
“exceptionally low levels” through mid-2015. On March 20, 2013, the Fed announced it 
continues to be committed to QE3. 66 
Evaluating the Case for Monetary Stimulus 
The Fed’s recent policy initiatives to provide successive rounds of monetary stimulus have been 
criticized. One concern is an increased risk of inflation. Such a large increase in bank reserves 
could also lead to a rapid increase in the overall money supply through the “money multiplier” 
effect, which in normal times might generate inflation. At present, the sizable degree of slack in 
the economy and banks’ heightened tendency to hold reserves rather than lend them out keeps the 
risk of inflation low. 
As noted above, one of the reasons for initiating a second round of monetary stimulus in late 2010 
was to counter an incipient deflation problem, which is accomplished by policies that exert 
upward pressure on the level of prices, that is, policies that generate some degree of inflation. The 
Fed’s second round of monetary stimulus seems to have reduced the deflation risk. 
Also, some of the recent increase in broad measures of inflation, such as the consumer price index 
(CPI), is due to the sharp rise in oil and other commodity prices in the first half of 2011 and again 
in early 2012. However, such inflation effects are most often temporary and not a source of 
persistent inflationary pressure. The “core CPI,” a measure of inflation that does not include 
volatile food and energy prices, has remained low. Other indicators also suggest that inflation is 
likely to remain subdued. First, wages, which are generally the most important determinant of 
unit production costs, have been stable. Second, longer-term inflationary expectations, as 
measured by the yields on long-term securities, have not risen appreciably. 
However, when the economy returns to more normal conditions, reserves would likely need to be 
removed to avoid excessive upward pressure on prices. The likely unprecedented scale of the 
reserves that might need to be drained from the economy has raised concerns about whether the 
Fed could effectively provide the degree of restraint needed to keep inflation under control. 
A second criticism of the Fed’s monetary stimulus during the recovery is that it is depreciating the 
dollar. Although influencing the exchange rate is not a stated goal of the Fed’s policy, standard 
macroeconomic theory would predict, all else equal, that a by-product of monetary stimulus 
would be a depreciation of the dollar (assuming other countries do not similarly alter their 
monetary policy in response). A weaker dollar would add to the stimulative effect of monetary 
stimulus on total spending in the United States by increasing exports and decreasing imports. 
However, countries such as Germany, Japan, and China that have relied on net exports to propel 
their economic growth are resistant to a depreciating dollar and have criticized the Fed’s actions. 
As it turns out, the dollar depreciation that has occurred over the last year is, arguably, not the 
result of Fed actions, but a correction from the appreciation of the dollar in late 2008 and 2009 
that was caused by a flight to safety by foreign investors during the financial crisis. At that time, a 
strong global demand for relatively safe U.S. Treasury securities bid up the dollar’s exchange 
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rate. As financial panic receded, the demand for safety abated, and the dollar depreciated to its 
pre-crisis level. 
A third criticism is that monetary stimulus will have little impact on real economic activity. In the 
current economic environment, with badly weakened household and business balance sheets 
placing a premium on improving liquidity, it is difficult for monetary policy to get “traction,” 
stimulating the broader economy by pumping reserves into the banking system. For this reason, 
the stimulus to the real economy from the Fed’s successive rounds of quantitative easing have not 
been expected to be a “cure-all” for sustaining economic recovery. Moreover, how effective 
monetary stimulus has been is difficult to judge because there is no ready “counterfactual” state 
of the economy from which to judge its impact on output and employment. Nevertheless, 
estimates are possible. Using statistical economic models that incorporate past relations between 
financial conditions and the economy, it is possible to estimate the impact of monetary stimulus 
on the economy. For example, one recent study found that the first two rounds of quantitative 
easing may have increased output by 3% and increased employment by more than 2 million 
jobs.67 Other studies have found comparable effects.68 
A Lesson from the Great Depression 
One of the important lessons from the Great Depression is to avoid a hasty withdrawal of fiscal 
and monetary stimulus in a fragile economy still recovering from a sharp economic decline. 
Beginning in 1933, the U.S. economy rebounded from its sharp fall into what has become known 
as the Great Depression. From 1933 to 1936, supported by expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies, the U.S. economy grew briskly at an average rate of 9.0% and unemployment fell from 
25% to 14%. Economic output had nearly returned to its level in 1929, but the economy was still 
well short of full recovery. But in 1937, the recovery halted and the economy tipped into a second 
recession. Most economists believe that the second dip into recession was caused by an 
unfortunate premature switch to contractionary monetary and fiscal policies in a still-fragile 
recovering economy. 
On the monetary side, in 1936, the Federal Reserve began to worry about inflation. After several 
years of relatively loose monetary policy, the U.S. banking system had built up large quantities of 
reserves in excess of legal reserve requirements. The Fed feared, despite little overt evidence of a 
problem, that should the banks begin to lend these excess reserves, it could lead to an 
overexpansion of credit and generate an inflationary surge. In an attempt to sop up those excess 
reserves, the Fed raised the banks’ reserve requirements three times during 1936. However, banks 
were still nervous about the financial panics of the early 1930s and uncertain about the durability 
of the economic recovery, and consequently wanted to hold excess reserves as a cushion. In 
response to the higher reserve requirements erasing that cushion, the banks worked to rebuild it 
by reducing lending, leading to a contraction of credit-supported spending. 
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On the fiscal side, by 1936, following several years of large budget deficits, the federal 
government had a strong urge to declare victory and get back to normal policy—specifically, 
balancing the government budget. The veterans’ bonus that was paid in 1936 was not renewed in 
1937; in addition, Social Security taxes were collected for the first time in 1937. The overall 
effect was a fiscal contraction equal to about 3% of GDP. 
The double hit of contractionary monetary and fiscal policy in an economy that had still not 
reached the point in which private demand was capable of fully sustaining economic growth led 
to a recession. In 1938, GDP fell 4.5% and the unemployment rate increased to 19%.69 
Economic policy quickly changed course and recovery resumed in the second half of 1938, but 
the policy error added about two years to the Great Depression, which ended with the step-up in 
war-time government spending in 1941. 
The euro zone countries appear to be re-learning this policy lesson from the Great Depression, at 
considerable economic cost. The IMF’s has recently argued that attempts to impose austerity 
measures to combat growing government debt, while still in the mist of economic recovery, is 
pulling growth down.70 
Economic Projections 
Given the unusually large deterioration of the balance sheets of households and businesses, the 
possible reduction of the U.S. economy’s level of potential output, the fragile state of the global 
economy, and uncertainty about fiscal policy, projections of the U.S. economy’s near-term path 
carry a higher than normal degree of uncertainty. During 2012, most economic forecasters have 
steadily trimmed their growth projections as it became ever more evident that the economy 
seemed to be only “treading water,” particularity in labor markets. Despite “headwinds” from a 
return to recession in Europe and federal fiscal tightening at home, most forecasters expect the 
U.S. economic recovery to continue, albeit at a slow pace. 
• In its March 2013 meeting, the Fed’s Open Market Committee projected real 
GDP in 2013 to advance in a range between 2.3% and 2.8% and in 2014 advance 
in a range between 2.9% to 3.4%. The unemployment rate in 2013 is projected to 
be in a range of 7.3% to 7.5% and in 2014 in a range of 6.5% to 3.5%.71 
• The IMF’s April 2013 projection sees real GDP in the United States increasing 
1.9% in 2013 and 3.0% in 2014. Globally, the IMF expects an unbalanced 
recovery to persist, with growth in the advanced economies in 2013 averaging 
3.3% compared with growth in the emerging developing economies in 2013 
averaging 5.3%.72 
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• In its February 2013 projection, CBO sees real GDP advancing 1.4% in 2013 and 
2.6% in 2014, and the unemployment rate at 7.9% in 2013 and 7.8% in 2014.73 
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